Anthony trollope on akrasia, Self-Deception, and ethical confusion by Fessenbecker P.
Anthony Trollope on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and Ethical 
Confusion 
Patrick Fessenbecker
Victorian Studies, Volume 56, Number 4, Summer 2014, pp. 649-674 (Article)
Published by Indiana University Press
For additional information about this article
Access provided by Bilkent Universitesi (4 Oct 2017 08:40 GMT)
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/564481
summer 2014
Anthony Trollope on Akrasia, Self-Deception, and 
Ethical Confusion
Patrick Fessenbecker
Anthony Trollope tended to reuse a particular version of the marriage plot.1 What Victoria Glendinning calls his “ur-story” (135) is a version of the romantic triangle in which protago-
nists, usually male, commit to marrying one character but then find 
themselves drawn to a second. The specific plot dynamics vary. some-
times the protagonist returns to the first character, sometimes he 
abandons his previous commitment; often, complications produce 
other outcomes. This aesthetic fact leads to a recurring consideration 
of a particular issue in philosophical psychology: moral philosophers 
have long been interested in situations where moral agents know what 
they ought to do, but do not do it.2 
At the most general level, the theoretical problem evoked by 
such states, which philosophers describe as instances of “weakness of 
the will” or “akrasia,” is a question in the logic of moral psychology: 
how can agents will something and not will it at the same time?3 On 
what one might call the “simple philosophical model,” ordinary action 
proceeds by an agent judging that a given action is worth performing; 
this decision constitutes an intention and produces an action. Hence it 
is not immediately clear how akratic action—which occurs somehow 
against an agent’s judgment—is possible. since agents frequently do 
seem to act against their better judgments, the simple model of 
AbstrAct: This essay takes as its point of departure Anthony Trollope’s tendency to 
reuse a version of the romantic triangle, one where a protagonist is committed to one 
character, becomes attracted to another, and hence delays fulfillment of the first rela-
tionship. This formal feature makes the philosophical problem of akrasia central, as 
the novels return repeatedly to agents who act against their own best judgment. Trol-
lope’s novels reveal a complex array of irrationality, considering how our desires can 
lead to self-deception and how even judgment unbiased by desire may fail to move an 
agent. Perhaps most interestingly, Trollope challenges standard assumptions about 
rational behavior in depicting states of “ethical confusion,” where characters act irra-
tionally precisely by acting on their best judgment.
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intentional action must be inadequate in some way. Yet this model is so 
intuitive that philosophers have often thought that akrasia proper 
never occurs. The first account of the problem, Plato’s discussion in 
the Protagoras, claims axiomatically that “to make for what one believes 
to be evil” is not in “human nature” (358d). When agents appear to do 
so, they are really confused about what course of action is best. As 
Amelie rorty explains, Plato’s “account of akrasia explains away coun-
terexamples by re-describing them as cases of deception of some sort” 
(54). in depicting characters who cannot bring their romantic actions 
into accord with their own best judgments about how to act, Trollope 
reflects insightfully on this issue. 
Frank Greystock, in The Eustace Diamonds (1871–73), offers a 
typical example. There is no doubt in Frank’s mind that he loves lucy 
morris more than his cousin lizzie eustace. early in the novel, he 
proposes to lucy, refusing to give up the engagement even though it is 
against his material interests. but despite this commitment, he continu-
ally finds himself violating his own judgment, in full awareness of what 
he is doing. After he flirts with and kisses lizzie, the narrator notes that 
“what [Frank] was doing was not only imprudent—but wrong also. He 
knew that it was so” (256). similarly, Frank fails to defend lucy in conver-
sation, knowing that “such silence was in truth treachery” (311). more 
dramatically, after lucy makes their engagement public, Frank is at first 
irritated, but then admits that “the truth is, we are, all of us, treating 
lucy very badly” (361). Alongside Frank’s own reflections on his nature, 
Trollope’s narrator considers his irrationality at some length:
There are human beings who, though of necessity single in body, are dual in char-
acter;—in whose breasts not only is evil always fighting against good,—but to 
whom evil is sometimes horribly, hideously evil, but is sometimes also not hideous 
at all. . . . self-indulgence, pride, and covetousness will get a hold of them, and in 
various moods will be to them virtues in lieu of vices. (199)
Passages like this one move from a depiction of akrasia to an analysis 
of it. Here, Trollope conceives of weakness of will as the product of 
psychological oscillation: akratic moral agents contain opposing 
impulses toward good and evil, which alternate in causing the agent’s 
actions. This causation happens not through compulsion, in such a 
way that the agent recognizes the evil but is powerless to overcome it, 
but rather through a change in beliefs akin to the one Plato had in 
mind. Frank’s judgments about what is good temporarily change: evil 
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changes to “not hideous at all”; ambition, luxury, and pride become 
“virtues in lieu of vices.” 
This is to say that Frank is susceptible to a particular type of 
self-deception: he is not a “rogue,” but his moral judgment is not 
immune to immoral influences. significantly, both narrator and novel 
are deeply interested in the process by which the vices “get a hold” of 
men like Frank Greystock. sexual desire in particular, the narrator 
explains, can temporarily lead such men astray: Frank “was fool 
enough to be flattered by [lizzie’s] caresses” (627–28). Trollope thus 
suggests a particular way of thinking about how actions against best 
judgments are possible: desire can temporarily alter such judgments. 
The point here is not merely to offer a reading of The Eustace 
Diamonds, but to demonstrate the interpretive usefulness of a concept 
from moral philosophy. because of his distinctive versions of the marriage 
plot, Trollope returns frequently to weak-willed agents like Frank. recog-
nizing this fact has two key benefits. First, the attention to moral 
psychology can clarify an interpretative debate about the tension in Trol-
lope’s fiction between ethics and psychology; Trollope is interested in 
precisely the areas where the two discourses intertwine. second and more 
substantively, the recognition of the role of akrasia in the main romantic 
plots allows a new dimension of Trollope’s art to emerge: his novels 
contain dozens of depictions of irrational action and self-deception, and 
these depictions (and his narratorial explanations of them) complement 
each other in philosophically revealing ways. in particular, Trollope’s 
works combine to offer a series of arguments against models of rationality 
that depend on reflective judgment and conscious decision-making. The 
critical tradition has long recognized that Trollope’s novels see ideal 
ethical deliberation as an instinctive process, suggesting that any substan-
tive ethical principle is incapable of acknowledging the particularities of 
a given situation. What an attention to irrationality suggests is that Trol-
lope does not hold this view merely because of the inability of such judg-
ments to achieve sufficient nuance; the defense of instinct stems also 
from a deep worry about the psychology of rational judgment.4 
I. Trollope, Morality, and Psychology
The contemporary critical debate about Trollope’s ethics 
remains indebted to ruth aproberts’s 1971 book The Moral Trollope, 
which contends that Trollope accepted a “situation ethics,” a sense of 
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moral evaluation that emphasized sensitivity to situational particulars. 
As she explains, “Trollope’s interest in complex cases is thoroughly 
and frankly and insistently ethical. His tender casuistry demands the 
most careful, detailed consideration of the circumstances, even those 
of a crime” (42). Put another way, Trollope’s novels depict the inade-
quacy of the application of general ethical principles to specific situ-
ations. by portraying moral problems with the full richness of 
accumulated detail, Trollope reveals the insensitivity of simple rules to 
the complexity of human ethical life. Trollope famously refused to 
define his key moral concept, the “gentleman,” suggesting that those 
who use the term know what it means without being able to articulate 
it propositionally. This refusal to elaborate straightforward moral 
claims is related to what aproberts tracks, in that Trollope’s casuistry 
involves reflecting on the sub-principles and provisos that enable 
moral agents to attend to situational specificity. significantly, his 
refusal of moral generalization makes aproberts’s Trollope almost an 
ethical skeptic, and certainly a relativist: “Trollope’s own position 
consists in ‘antisystematism’” (65), she writes, later claiming that “his 
distinguishing consistency . . . can best be thought of as a relativism” 
(125).
Yet, as James kincaid has pointed out, for all his ethical sensi-
tivity there is nevertheless a discernible moral code in Trollope’s works:
it is true that [Trollope’s] novels consistently attack all forms of purism and abso-
lutism, but not generally to establish simple relativism in their place. The stan-
dards are all there; they are made more difficult to apply and far more difficult to 
define; most of all, there is less communal agreement on what they are. but they 
are dependent on codes which are not to be defined by situations. (12)
kincaid is thus prepared to grant the claim about casuistry, agreeing 
that Trollope emphasizes the adjustments moral agents must make to 
apply general ethical rules to particular situations. However, it does 
not follow from this emphasis that everything is relative to the situa-
tion; the principle being applied necessarily depends on “extra-situa-
tional” criteria. To offer an example kincaid mentions later, the 
question of how to act honestly in a given situation is only meaningful 
if the word “honesty” has a meaning independent of the description of 
the situation. For kincaid, Trollope’s moral philosophy is concerned 
with how best to live out a moral code. rather than relying on the 
careful deductive application of a general rule, kincaid’s Trollope 
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advocates a moral model—the gentleman—who instinctively senses 
how to behave.
Amanda Anderson has criticized this interpretive strain by 
pointing out that many of Trollope’s most memorable characters 
become so by virtue of the conflict between their own psychological 
features and the moral code by which they are attempting to live. As 
she puts it,
They manifest not exactly integrity but rather a kind of stubbornness or obsession 
that often shades into perversity. The tense imbrication of morality and 
psychology, the irreversible mediation of morality by psychology, thus becomes a 
fundamental narrative interest, and problem, for Trollope. Any account of ethics 
in Trollope that does not appreciate this fact . . . fails to acknowledge the promi-
nent issue of recalcitrant psychologies even, or especially, among the morally 
favored characters. (511) 
Anderson’s point is that both aproberts and kincaid fail to acknowl-
edge that Trollope’s depiction of the difficulties of ethical life is in 
some significant sense the result of his interest in characters whose 
psychological makeup inevitably frustrates their moral agency. Thus 
the problem Trollope identifies pertains not so much to the difficulty 
of applying moral rules to specific situations—which is in some sense a 
problem outside the moral agent—but rather to the difficulty of living 
according to a moral rule given the stubborn, intractable, and possibly 
perverse thing that one is. 
Anderson suggests that the focus on psychology supplants a 
focus on morality: “Trollope is always putting into question the limits 
of morality by focusing on recalcitrant psychological impulses and on 
the transformations that psychological habit effects on affirmed prin-
ciple” (515). As the interpretive use of akrasia suggests, however, it is 
possible to see Trollope’s investment in such psychological issues as 
reflecting the importance of a particular kind of moral problem rather 
than a belief about the limited scope of the moral realm. ethical criti-
cism can acknowledge the problem of recalcitrant psychologies by 
enriching the meaning of the term “ethics.” That is, it is possible to 
follow aproberts and kincaid in seeing Trollope as invested in the 
nuances of ethical life, but follow Anderson in thinking of the prob-
lems that ensue as the result of internal, psychological difficulties. 
in considering these moral-psychological problems, Trollope’s 
work complements and is complemented by an important minor strain 
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in Victorian moral thought. For the most part, the dominant utili-
tarian thinkers failed to recognize akrasia as a problem. relying on 
the simple model of philosophical agency, they believed that agents 
would necessarily pursue whatever end they judged would maximize 
their own pleasure: as Jeremy bentham put it, “nature has placed 
mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and 
pleasure. it is for them alone . . . to determine what we shall do” (65). 
The idea that an agent might judge that an action maximized her 
happiness and then not behave accordingly—that is, that she might act 
akratically—is essentially inconceivable. 
but as Jerome schneewind has noted, the intuitionist moral 
philosophers—unlike the utilitarians—took as emblematic of morality 
in general those problems “in which the agent knows what to do but 
finds it difficult to bring himself to do it” (33). many of the less-remem-
bered writers stefan collini has called the Victorian “public moralists” 
were also aware of the problem; in his description, “the fear was not 
relativism but weakness of will” (100). Finally, and like Trollope, the 
pre-Freudian psychologists who theorized the “morally insane” took as 
central the issue of self-control, offering sophisticated accounts of 
moral rationality and the ways in which it can fail.5
For much of the twentieth century, Anglo-American moral 
philosophers—still largely working within the utilitarian tradition—
generally defended the simple model of agency. in the last quarter of 
the century, however, they began to recognize the importance of 
akrasia and irrationality more generally for a full account of moral 
agency. A seminal 1970 paper by donald davidson reignited this philo-
sophical conversation by spelling out the intuitions behind the simple 
model of agency and acknowledging the problem akrasia presents to 
it. The response to davidson has been rich and varied and, when 
combined with elements of minor strains of Victorian morality, it 
allows an underlying coherence in Trollope’s depictions of irrationality 
to emerge. The type of akratic protagonist Trollope most often 
depicts—which includes Frank Greystock, but also characters such as 
the duke of Omnium and Phineas Finn—manifests a kind of self-
deception importantly different from that implied by davidson’s view. 
rather than holding that such irrationality is a state, in which an agent 
both believes and doesn’t believe something at the same time, Trollope 
shows it to be a process, whereby the ordinary means by which agents 
decide on actions and beliefs are misled by desires. When he depicts 
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situations in which agents are not self-deceived and act freely against a 
better judgment of which they are aware, Trollope demonstrates skep-
ticism about the assumption, central to davidson’s view, that judg-
ments carry motivational power. Trollope’s depiction of “conscious 
akrasia” in George Vavasor and Glencora Palliser suggests that the 
reasonableness of a judgment may have little impact on an agent’s 
actions. Finally, and perhaps most profoundly, Trollope questions 
models of rationality that define reasonable behavior as that which 
accords with one’s judgment. Through “ethically confused” characters 
like Alice Vavasor, Trollope shows how agents can act irrationally 
precisely by acting in accordance with their best judgment; correspond-
ingly, he indicates that such agents would have been better off acting 
akratically, trusting recalcitrant impulses. Trollope’s fiction accordingly 
contributes to the debates around akrasia in three ways: he shows how 
self-deception can easily mislead judgment; how judgment can fail to 
motivate even when it is not self-deceived; and, finally, how even unbi-
ased deliberation can still be mistaken. Taken together, Trollope’s 
depictions of the psychology of irrationality thus concord with his 
emphasis on casuistry, in order both to criticize the assumption that 
reflective judgment is the primary capacity for moral life, and to support 
the sophisticated but instinctive moral agency of the gentleman.
II. Self-Deception
davidson argued for the possibility of akrasia by distinguishing 
between three kinds of judgments: “prima facie” judgments, which judge 
a given action preferable over another in some respect; “all things consid-
ered” judgments, which determine a given action preferable in all 
respects; and “all out” judgments, which essentially decide to perform a 
given action. Akrasia is possible, davidson claims, because of the gap 
between “all things considered” and “all out” judgments. An agent can 
conclude that, all things considered, it would be best to turn off the tele-
vision and go to sleep, but then fail to form the all-out judgment that 
leads to turning the television off. in such situations, on davidson’s 
model, the agent falls back on some prima facie judgment—perhaps that 
watching television is better than sleeping with respect to the desire to 
know what happens on Mad Men. What davidson calls “the principle of 
continence” (“How is Weakness” 41), the philosophical core of his 
account of self-control, depends on connecting “all out” judgments 
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(“intending” 98) to “all things considered” judgments, avoiding the 
akratic break (“How is Weakness” 40). 
explaining akrasia by appealing to a gap between judgments 
allows davidson to preserve the basic theory of agency that the simple 
philosophical model affords: judgments still produce intentions, which 
in turn cause actions. if these are not exactly separable as mental 
phenomena, they are nevertheless distinguishable as components of 
the process of action. The psychological notion at work here is one 
davidson calls a “mild form of ‘internalism’” (26). The term refers to 
the view that an agent’s judgments about what is worth pursuing have 
motivational, and thus causal, force; the opposite pole, “externalism,” 
holds that our judgments and beliefs about what is worth doing have 
little or no effect on our motivations and desires. The internalist 
contends that the causes of an action are internal to the deliberative 
process that produces the belief that the action is worth doing; collo-
quially, what happens in my consciousness leads to what my body does. 
This internalist commitment explains why davidson emphasizes prima 
facie judgments. even in cases of akratic action, a judgment produces 
the movement of the agent’s body; it’s just that the judgment isn’t of 
the “all things considered” type. 
This solution comes, however, at a philosophical cost. in 
claiming that actions can sometimes stem from a partial judgment not 
representative of the full deliberative process, davidson imagines the 
self as divisible, so that there are moments when part of a moral agent 
acts rather than the whole. This “partitioning of the mind” is implau-
sible, davidson’s critics have argued, for it posits the existence of “semi-
autonomous structures” within the mind that can serve as “mental 
causes for other mental states” without being “reasons.” They can 
somehow cause action without being constitutive of full judgment 
(mele, Irrationality 75–76). 
it is possible to see the problem more clearly by considering 
the issue of self-deception, about which davidson defended a similar 
strategy.6 One way to make sense of the peculiar state wherein an agent 
appears both to know and not know a given thing—say, that his spouse 
is faithful—is to claim that a part of the agent knows the spouse is 
faithful, while the rest believes that the spouse is not. This is to see self-
deception as structurally analogous to interpersonal deception: the 
deceiver and the deceived are separate agents. but surely, the critique 
goes, this is implausible. As with the approach to akrasia, this way of 
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addressing the problem posits a number of dubious mental phenomena, 
sites of knowledge that exist within a person without being constitutive 
of that person. 
Alfred mele, among others, has suggested an alternate 
approach, arguing that self-deception and akrasia do not describe 
states of conflict within an agent’s mind, but rather indicate failures in 
the ways agents arrive at action and form beliefs. self-deception, from 
this perspective, is not a split between two contradictory beliefs but one 
belief arrived at in an irrational—because motivationally influenced—
way. in similar fashion, akrasia is not a state in which a tension between 
a judgment and an action splits an agent, but rather one in which the 
operation of practical reason has been misled. 
it is this alternative view that Trollope’s representation of self-
deception supports, and this particular kind of irrationality—that is, 
self-deception, as opposed to what this essay terms “conscious akrasia” or 
“ethical confusion”—forms perhaps the most prevalent form of weak-
ness of will in his fiction. even Plantagenet Palliser, whom Trollope terms 
“a perfect gentleman” in his Autobiography (361), eventually succumbs to 
it. The Duke’s Children (1879) opens typically with a marriage crisis, with 
Palliser’s daughter in love with a man whom he does not approve of. His 
beloved and now-deceased wife, however, encouraged the relationship 
behind his back, and thus Palliser (now the duke of Omnium) irratio-
nally redirects his anger against his wife’s best friend, mrs. Finn, who has 
advised the young couple. As the narrator explains, Palliser is “driven by 
the desire of his heart to acquit the wife he had lost of the terrible impru-
dence . . . of which she was now accused” (38). The duke’s desire to 
“acquit” lady Glencora of manipulating him affects the way he assesses 
the situation and drives him into self-deception. 
Palliser’s mode of irrationality does not result from his holding 
contradictory beliefs (as in the davidsonian account); rather, it stems 
from motivationally influenced belief formation. Put another way, 
what Palliser wishes to be true affects how he sees the evidence for and 
against his beliefs. Trollope’s narrator represents the process with 
some subtlety: 
He struggled gallantly to acquit the memory of his wife. He could best do that by 
leaning with the full weight of his mind on the presumed iniquity of mrs. Finn. 
Had he not known from the first that the woman was an adventuress? And had he 
not declared to himself over and over again that between such a one and himself 
there should be no intercourse, no common feeling? He had allowed himself to be 
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talked into an intimacy, to be talked almost into an affection. And this was the 
result! (49–50) 
As the analysis offered by the narrator in the first two sentences fades 
into a passage of free indirect discourse representing Palliser’s increas-
ingly self-deceived thoughts, the way in which motivation affects the 
understanding of evidence becomes clear. rather than remembering 
his wife’s willingness to manipulate love affairs, his thoughts are redi-
rected into the irrelevant beginnings of his relationship with mrs. 
Finn, to whom the old duke, Plantagenet’s father, had proposed 
marriage at the end of his life. The fact that then-madame Goesler had 
declined the proposal is dismissed; for Palliser at this moment, mrs. 
Finn is an “adventuress.”
in thus attending to irrelevant evidence, the duke exemplifies 
self-deception through what mele calls “error costs,” which involve the 
pain an agent will suffer if a belief turns out to be false (Self-Deception 
42). if the duke believes wrongly that his wife is innocent, the mistake 
is largely harmless, but if he wrongly believes that she is guilty, he will 
have unfairly condemned the woman he loved. As such, he unreflec-
tively sets the standard of evidence for proof of his wife’s guilt extremely 
high, and the standard for proving mrs. Finn’s guilt much lower: 
He had come to entertain an idea that mrs. Finn had been the great promoter of 
the sin, and he thought that Tregear [his daughter’s lover] had told him that that 
lady had been concerned with the matter from the beginning. in all this there was 
a craving in his heart to lessen the amount of culpable responsibility which might 
seem to attach itself to the wife he had lost. (55)
The narrator makes clear that the hope of “lessening” his wife’s fault 
affects Palliser’s belief formation. since he would suffer in believing that 
his wife manipulated him behind his back, the mere assertions from 
Tregear and mrs. Finn of his wife’s involvement in the affair do not 
constitute sufficient evidence of guilt. conversely, Palliser’s desires make 
it quite easy to convict mrs. Finn of “iniquity.” she has briefly interceded 
with Tregear as a mentor, and while her primary advice was for Tregear 
to confess everything to Palliser, the mere fact of the intercession, along 
with her past flirtation with the old duke, becomes sufficient evidence 
to demonstrate that she is the “great promoter of the sin.”
even after it becomes clear that mrs. Finn’s behavior has been 
praiseworthy, the duke somewhat willfully continues to condemn her. 
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As Trollope depicts it, this is again a result of error cost: it would cost 
the duke a great deal to believe that he had treated her unfairly. After 
receiving a letter from mrs. Finn accusing him of injustice, Palliser 
reflects on his behavior:
He tried to set himself to the task in perfect honesty. He certainly had condemned 
her. . . . And when he considered it all, he had to own that her intimacy with his 
uncle and his wife had not been so much of her seeking as of theirs. . . . And after 
all this,—after the affectionate surrender of herself to his wife’s caprices which the 
woman had made,—he had turned upon her and driven her away with ignominy. 
That was all true. As he thought of it he became hot, and was conscious of a quiv-
ering feeling round his heart. . . . if he could make it good to himself that in a 
matter of such magnitude as the charge of his daughter she had been untrue to 
him. . . . Then would it have been impossible that he should have done aught else 
than cast her out! As he thought of this he felt sure that she had betrayed him! 
(100–01)
Palliser consciously tries to avoid deceiving himself, aspiring to 
“perfect honesty” in evaluating his conduct. And he starts well, first 
recognizing that mrs. Finn was not really an “adventuress” in becoming 
acquainted with the Palliser family, and then admitting the deep 
friendship between her and his wife. And yet a “feeling round his heart 
rises” when he considers how inappropriate his own conduct has been; 
“driving” mrs. Finn ignominiously away will be justified only if he can 
“make it good to himself” that she was in fact “untrue.” Thus he 
misleads himself into believing that she was unfaithful: “As he thought 
of this, he felt sure she had betrayed him,” a certainty that relies not on 
evidence but on how heavily his own need for self-approval depends on 
mrs. Finn’s betrayal. 
in keeping with the gentlemanly ideal he exemplifies, however, 
Palliser eventually overcomes his self-deception and apologizes to mrs. 
Finn. The perception involved in such self-mastery is central to Trol-
lope’s conception of honesty. in his book on cicero, Trollope remarks: 
To be believed because of your truth, and yet to lie; to be trusted for your honesty, 
and yet to cheat; to have credit for patriotism, and yet to sell your country! The 
temptations to do this are rarely put before a man plainly, in all their naked ugli-
ness. They certainly were not so presented to cicero by caesar and his associates. 
The bait was held out to him, as it is daily to others, in a form not repellent, with 
words fitted to deceive and powerful almost to persuade. . . . but at last [cicero] 
saw his way clear to honesty. (Life 194) 
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cicero refuses to let his actions be guided by “temptations,” masters his 
motivations, and acts on his own best judgment; in this way, he avoids 
weakness of will. but the more specific problem cicero confronts is 
self-deception. The “bait” does not appear in its “naked ugliness” and 
is “not repellent,” but instead appears in a form “fitted to deceive and 
powerful almost to persuade”; this is to see it as an influence relying on 
a disguised appeal to desire, in the same way that the duke’s desire to 
believe his wife was innocent led him to believe mrs. Finn was guilty of 
manipulating the romantic affairs of his children. To Trollope, it is not 
so significant that cicero is open with others; rather, he is admirable 
because he is finally honest with himself.
The strains of Victorian moral philosophy that dealt with 
akrasia cohere closely with Trollope’s depictions of self-deception. 
somewhat ironically, one finds a particularly clear expression of this 
view in the utilitarian thought of Henry sidgwick.7 Arguing that the 
philosophical tradition had refused to recognize “unreasonable 
action,” sidgwick suggests that weakness of the will most commonly 
arises from fallacious chains of practical reasoning that the agent 
momentarily fails to recognize as fallacious: 
When a general resolution is remembered, while yet the particular conclusion 
which ought to be drawn is not drawn, the cause of the phenomenon is a tempo-
rary perversion of judgment by some seductive feeling. . . . [Given] a hard and 
distasteful task which he regards it as his duty to do, [a man] then rapidly but 
sincerely persuades himself that in the present state of his brain some lighter work 
is just at present more suited to his powers. (255–56)
Further, when a “seductive feeling” prevents an agent from drawing a 
particular conclusion that he or she rationally should, the feeling 
“operates not by producing positively fallacious reasoning, but by 
directing attention to certain aspects of the subject, and from certain 
others” (258). 
Thus, an akratic agent often senses “that he might come to a 
different view of his position if he resolutely faced certain aspects of it 
tending to reduce his personal claims; but he consciously refrains from 
directing attention to them” (259). As in Trollope’s account, there is no 
sense that the man somehow knows and does not know a given belief. 
rather, a “seductive” feeling has “perverted” his judgment, self-decep-
tively convincing him that “some lighter work” is more suitable than the 
difficult task initially undertaken. moreover, the man’s irrationality 
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arises in a manner similar to Palliser’s, in that his motivations deter-
mine the “aspects of the subject” to which he directs “attention,” and—
as with Palliser’s desire to believe well of himself—his “personal claims” 
lead him astray.8 
if The Duke’s Children essentially corroborates the account of 
self-deception as motivated reasoning in mele and sidgwick, Phineas 
Finn (1867–68) considers but ultimately rejects davidson’s account of 
self-deception as a contradiction between internal states. Phineas Finn 
tries to convince himself that he is, in some sense, two agents; crucially, 
however, Trollope presents Phineas’s belief not as a lucid account of his 
actual internal division, but as a product of motivated self-deception. 
in the first novel that bears his name, Phineas finds himself after elec-
tion to Parliament in a series of romantic entanglements, first with 
lady laura standish, then with Violet effingham, and finally with 
madame max Goesler. All the while, however, he is in an implicit way 
engaged to a woman back home, mary Flood Jones, with whom Phineas 
grew up in ireland. 
Phineas deals with this romantic tension by imagining that he 
is two different people:
He felt that he had two identities,—that he was, as it were, two separate persons,—
and that he could, without any real faithlessness, be very much in love with Violet 
effingham in his position of man of fashion and member of Parliament in 
england, and also warmly attached to dear little mary Flood Jones as an irishman 
of killaloe. He was aware, however, that there was a prejudice against such fullness 
of heart, and, therefore, resolved sternly that it was his duty to be constant to miss 
effingham. (263)
And similarly, after giving up his pursuit of Violet effingham, the 
reader hears: 
His irish life, he would tell himself, was a thing quite apart and separate from his 
life in england. He said not a word about mary Flood Jones to any of those with 
whom he lived in london. Why should he, feeling as he did that it would so soon 
be necessary that he should disappear from among them? (500)
As these passages reveal, Phineas makes sense of himself by parti-
tioning his agency: he has “two separate identities,” is “two separate 
persons,” with an “irish life” quite different from his “life in england.” 
but Trollope’s narration clarifies the extent to which Phineas is 
mistaken: his mental division represents only what Phineas “would tell 
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himself,” what he “feels,” and what allows him to think that he is not 
guilty of “faithlessness.” Phineas thus evades what richard moran has 
called the responsibility of the authority that arises from bearing a 
first-personal relation to one’s actions (81). by pretending that the 
person in ireland is different from and not in control of the person in 
england, Phineas avoids having to deal with his own duplicity. And his 
inchoate recognition of this fact appears in his awareness of the “preju-
dice against such fullness of heart.” The ironic contrast between the 
romantic phrase representing Phineas’s consciousness and the read-
er’s awareness that Phineas is essentially trying to justify infidelity 
reveals the extent to which Phineas is fooling himself. 
As with Palliser, the primary cause of Phineas’s self-deception 
is his desire: he convinces himself of the possibility of a dual life 
because this allows him to achieve the multiple sexual relationships for 
which he yearns. At the point when Phineas has convinced himself that 
he loves Violet and cannot marry mary, he nevertheless goes out with 
mary during a visit back to ireland. The narrator explains:
Perhaps there is no position more perilous to a man’s honesty than that in which 
Phineas now found himself . . . knowing himself to be quite loved by a girl whom 
he almost loves himself. . . . Phineas was not in love with mary Flood Jones; but he 
would have liked to take her in his arms and kiss her . . . and did, at the moment, 
think that it might be possible to have one life in london and another life alto-
gether different at killaloe. (369)
The narrator makes explicit the threat to Phineas’s “honesty,” as his 
desire to flirt with mary leads him to “think it might be possible” to 
have a relationship with her and maintain his affection for Violet. 
importantly, he is not consciously duplicitous; the text makes it clear 
he does not intend to hurt mary. but he does in fact behave badly 
toward her, and does so by convincing himself it is possible for part of 
him to act without all of him acting. 
What Frank Greystock, Palliser, and Phineas Finn together 
reveal is the extent to which self-deceived irrationality is a structuring 
element of Trollope’s fiction. indeed, Phineas’s subsequent narrative 
makes this particularly clear: mary Flood Jones dies before the begin-
ning of Phineas Redux. The woman to whom Phineas has committed 
himself, and marries at the end of Phineas Finn, representing the 
triumph of his self-control, disappears from the rest of his story. insofar 
as it reopens the possibility of weakness of will within Phineas’s romantic 
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life, mary’s death is necessary for Trollope’s narrative logic: a Phineas 
with fully integrated motivations would not allow for a vivid depiction 
of the distortions of practical reasoning. early in Phineas Redux, the 
narrator criticizes Phineas, remarking that “in his character there was 
much of weakness, much of vacillation” (79). it is precisely because of 
the philosophical complexities of these failings, however, that the 
character is of such interest to Trollope.
III. Conscious Akrasia
Alongside these portrayals of self-deception, Trollope occa-
sionally depicts conscious akrasia, wherein an agent recognizes that a 
given action is mistaken but performs it anyway. Although the bulk of 
the novel is concerned with self-deception, the resolution of Phineas’s 
akrasia at the climax of Phineas Finn exemplifies this more conscious 
kind of irrationality. Phineas visits madame max Goesler, believing she 
will propose marriage to him and intending to decline it in order to 
marry mary. no longer self-deceived, complete self-mastery still eludes 
him; he must deliberately remind himself of his commitment to mary 
in order to prevent irrational flirtation: 
There was a care about his person which he would have hardly taken had he been 
quite assured that he simply intended to say good-bye to the lady whom he was 
about to visit. but if there were any such conscious feeling, he administered to 
himself an antidote before he left the house. On returning to the sitting-room he 
went to a little desk from which he took out the letter from mary which the reader 
has seen, and carefully perused every word of it. “she is the best of them all,” he 
said to himself, as he refolded the letter. (533) 
The passage emphasizes, first of all, the recalcitrance of desire. despite 
his overt intentions, Phineas unreflectively dresses attractively for the 
meeting—in sidgwick’s terms, the desire draws his attention to certain 
kinds of clothing in a way that warps his original deliberation. second, 
and crucially, Phineas here demonstrates what mele calls self-control 
as an “ability,” after demonstrating over the course of the novel that he 
lacks it as a “trait” (Irrationality 58). mele intends for the distinction to 
capture the difference between self-control through reflective tech-
niques and self-control as a property of character. One might think 
here of the difference between agents who get themselves out of bed 
through a complex series of alarm clocks and agents who get out of 
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bed simply as a result of deciding to wake up at a certain time. The 
latter are “exceptionally resolute” agents, who have “no need to make 
an effort of self-control even when faced with strong competing 
desires” (59). it is because Phineas lacks this kind of resolve that he 
must consciously work to control himself. since he knows his judgment 
may fail to motivate him when the chips are down, in an encounter 
fraught with temptation he bolsters the motivational strength of his 
judgment by rereading a letter from mary. 
This weakness arises from a somewhat startling evaluative 
instability. Trollope’s narrator criticizes Phineas’s attempt to bolster 
himself by judging that mary is the “best” of the women he might 
marry, explaining:
i am not sure that it is well that a man should have any large number from whom 
to select a best; as, in such circumstances, he is so very apt to change his judgment 
from hour to hour. The qualities which are the most attractive before dinner 
sometimes become the least so in the evening. (533)
in the offhand remark that a man is “so very apt to change his judg-
ment,” this passage expresses a striking skepticism about the stability 
of character. Phineas’s weakness is not merely a result of his lack of 
resolve, but results more substantively from the weak nature of human 
judgment: his judgments fail to motivate him, the passage implies, 
because they are so changeable.
These passages suggest Trollope’s skepticism regarding what 
davidson called internalism, the position that judgments are intrinsi-
cally motivational. On the opposing externalist view, akrasia results 
from the difference between an “agent’s assessments or rankings of 
the objects of his wants and the motivational force of those wants” 
(mele, Irrationality 11). This is to say that self-control is difficult and 
akrasia common because the connections between judgments and 
motivations are so tenuous: merely judging that an action is worth-
while may have little effect on what an agent actually does. To put the 
objection in davidson’s terms, akrasia happens not because an agent 
falls back on a prima facie judgment, but because the motivational 
power of some other option outweighs the motivational power of an 
“all things considered” judgment. i do not keep watching Mad Men 
because i fall back on the judgment that it is the better option than 
sleep with respect to some desire, but because that desire is motivation-
ally stronger than my reasons.9 The point is not precisely that the 
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desire overwhelms such agents in a way that compels them; rather, the 
claim is that when they do decide to act, their reasons play a lesser role 
in the decision than the motivations created by their desires. 
This rejection of internalism appears in a number of different 
ways in Trollope’s works, but Can You Forgive Her? (1864–65) is particu-
larly suited to an exploration of the issue. it brings together a number 
of conscious akratics, each of whom demonstrates an important differ-
ence from the sort of self-deceived irrationality exemplified by Palliser. 
George Vavasor, for instance, approaches self-conscious villainy. upon 
Alice Vavasor’s refusal to embrace him after their engagement, he 
recognizes that she does not love him but concludes that he will take 
her money anyway. The narrator explains: “When Alice contrived as 
she had done to escape the embrace he was so well justified in asking, 
he knew the whole truth. He was sore at heart, and very angry withal. 
He could have readily spurned her from him . . . [and] would have 
done so had not his need for her money restrained him. He knew that 
this was so, and he told himself that he was a rascal” (406). Here, 
George differs from self-deceived characters in openly recognizing the 
wrongness of his actions, yet performing them anyway; his judgment 
that they are wrong simply fails to motivate him. 
Trollope is at pains to explain how George can simultaneously 
recognize himself as a rascal and yet treat Alice in such a fashion. The 
narrator remarks: 
Vavasor had educated himself to badness with his eyes open. He had known what 
was wrong, and had done it, having taught himself to think that bad things were 
best . . . [yet he] would sometimes feel tempted to cut his throat and put an end to 
himself, because he knew that he had taught himself amiss. Again, he would sadly 
ask himself whether it was yet too late; always, however, answering himself that it 
was too late. . . . He believed in his own ability, he believed thoroughly in his own 
courage; but he did not believe in his own conduct. (481–82) 
in George, a true separation between evaluations and intentions 
emerges: for him, the internalist notion that evaluations have motiva-
tional power has become entirely untrue. The fact that he knows 
himself to be a rascal is not sufficient to lead him to change; it is “too 
late” to do so. 
One might think that George is self-deceived in the same way 
Phineas is; the line indicating that George “had taught himself to 
believe that bad things were best” could suggest that George has fooled 
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himself into thinking that immoral actions are in fact praiseworthy. 
The emphasis, however, falls on George’s awareness of what he has 
been doing: he “educated himself to badness with open eyes,” and 
does “not believe in his own conduct.” Then, too, the context is 
revealing, in that the narrator compares George to mr. bott, a fellow 
new member of Parliament, who—though he “meant to do well”—was 
“born small” (480). The narrator explains that mr. bott “did not know 
that he was doing amiss in seeking to rise by tuft-hunting and toadying. 
He was both mean and vain . . . [but] was troubled by no idea that he 
did wrong” (480–81). mr. bott suffers from a garden-variety form of 
self-deception: he acts immorally but has no awareness of the fact. 
Given that the passage draws a contrast between the two, one must 
understand George as caught in a much darker state of agency in 
which he is helpless to act from what Trollope calls the “better part of 
his nature.” 
if George knows what he does is wrong while mr. bott does not, 
lady Glencora Palliser knows that what she would do is wrong. Although 
situational constraints do not allow Glencora to act on her desires, her 
impulse to act against her own judgment parallels George Vavasor’s. she 
is drawn to burgo Fitzgerald and away from her husband in a way that 
she recognizes as wrong but is powerless to stop: “i know what i am, and 
what i am like to become. i loathe myself, and i loathe the thing that i am 
thinking of” (306). much like George, Glencora is a conscious akratic: 
she would have run with away with burgo, but exterior forces—her 
husband and her family—have prevented her from acting at all. 
The distinction between lady Glencora and George emerges 
when she deploys self-control as an ability. she alters her circumstances 
to prevent an elopement by avoiding burgo socially and enlisting Alice 
in the service of preventing any sort of meeting between her and her 
ex-lover. As the narrator describes Glencora, “she was as one who, in 
madness, was resolute to throw herself from a precipice, but to whom 
some remnant of sanity remained which forced her to seek those who 
would save her from herself” (453). This scene is akin to Phineas’s deci-
sion to fortify his resolution through the “antidote” of rereading mary’s 
letter: Glencora’s decision to draw on forces outside herself represents 
an awareness of the gap between her reasons and her actual motiva-
tions. believing that she will elope if she is left to her own devices, she 
does not—as George does—let the chips fall where they may, but 
instead adds additional motivational strength to her reasons.10 in this 
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way, Glencora and George offer a philosophically significant juxta-
position: if George represents Trollope’s awareness of the motivational 
gap, Glencora represents his suggestion for how moral agents ought to 
address such a condition. 
IV. Ethical Confusion
The instances of irrationality presented thus far do not yet ques-
tion the role of deliberative judgment within an account of rational 
behavior. if self-deceived characters demonstrate Trollope’s recognition 
of the ways judgment can be misled, and conscious akratics demonstrate 
his recognition of the ways judgment can fail to motivate, both sorts of 
moral problem still reinforce the importance of judgment. in other 
words, failures of corrupted judgment and insufficient motivation both 
imply that moral action requires freeing one’s judgment from bias and 
bringing one’s behavior into accord with one’s judgment. but the depth 
of Trollope’s reflection on the issue appears in the fact that he also 
considers what is in some sense the opposite problem. challenging the 
assumption that correct judgment is essential to rational behavior, Trol-
lope depicts extended states of ethical confusion, in which a character’s 
sincere, honest, and careful deliberative judgment is nevertheless deeply 
mistaken. in such moments, he represents emotions not as biases that 
produce irrationality, but instead as sub-reflective guides that point to a 
moral agent’s real reasons. in such situations a character’s rationality 
does not lie in finding ways to overcome those feelings and act in accord 
with her best judgment, but rather in trusting her feelings and acting 
against that judgment. 
The suggestion that weakness of will might be rational repre-
sents a powerful challenge to the davidsonian view. nomy Arpaly 
points out that one’s “all things considered” judgment is, after all, just 
another belief and thus certainly susceptible to error (512). Arpaly 
argues that there is no guarantee that reflection, even under ideal 
circumstances, will prevent mistakes. even if one limits the conception 
of rationality to what Arpaly calls the “coherence of the agent’s mental 
states” (496), the possibility of reflective error remains; even when the 
only question is which action best serves an agent’s interests, the agent 
can still err through subjective irrationality or confusion about what 
her interests actually are. When caught up in such confusion, Arpaly 
argues, akrasia is not necessarily irrational. Given two irrational 
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actions, where one is against an agent’s real interests and desires but in 
accord with her judgment, and the other is against an agent’s best 
judgment but in accord with her real interests and desires, the fact that 
the latter is akratic is inconsequential. in a state of ethical confusion, 
an agent’s recalcitrant emotions and instincts—affective states that 
resist the control of rational judgment—can be guides to her genuine 
interests.11 Thus akrasia matters less than one might think: agents who 
act on the basis of recalcitrant emotions might be procedurally irra-
tional, but they are better off than they would be if they insisted on 
following their judgment.12
in Can You Forgive Her? Alice Vavasor’s extensive reflection on 
whom to marry exemplifies the kind of irrationality Arpaly describes. 
As Trollope’s representation indicates, ethically confused delibera-
tions can be quite sophisticated; indeed, the implication is that their 
extent and depth are part of the problem. Alice’s deliberation has led 
her to vacillate between her choices: she has been engaged to George 
Vavasor, is engaged to John Grey at the novel’s beginning, returns to 
George, and then marries John. The narrator criticizes Alice’s 
deliberations:
That Alice Vavasor had thought too much about it, i feel quite sure. . . . she had 
gone on thinking of the matter till her mind had become filled with some unde-
fined idea of the importance to her of her own life. . . . if [a woman] shall have 
recognized the necessity of truth and honesty for the purposes of her life, i do not 
know that she need ask herself many questions as to what she will do with it. Alice 
Vavasor was ever asking herself that question, and had by degrees filled herself 
with a vague idea that there was a something to be done; a something over and 
beyond, or perhaps altogether beside that marrying and having two children;—if 
she only knew what it was. (140–41)
Alice’s extensive reflections on what to do with her life have come to 
mislead her; she has developed a “vague idea” that a life spent in 
married domesticity is somehow inadequate. Trollope’s alternative is 
revealing, since he suggests not that Alice ought to have deliberated 
differently but rather that she should not have deliberated to such an 
extent at all. Once they have recognized the importance of “truth and 
honesty,” agents need not think very much about what to do with their 
lives more generally.
As kate Flint has noted, Trollope’s portrayal of Alice undoubt-
edly reflects Victorian sexual politics. certainly, Trollope reveals a version 
AnTHOnY TrOllOPe On AkrAsiA, selF-decePTiOn, And eTHicAl cOnFusiOn 669
summer 2014
of separate-spheres ideology in the suggestion that Alice’s confusion 
arises from her belief that she should do something with her life 
besides “marrying and having two children.” The anti-feminist 
impulses inherent in this view become more obvious in the narrator’s 
explanation that Alice has become confused after listening to a “flock 
of learned ladies” (140). As such, it is difficult not to see ideological 
content in Trollope’s suggestion that Alice should not reflectively delib-
erate, but instead just feel and act. nevertheless, the destabilization of 
rational judgment here is philosophically insightful. 
For instance, the narrator returns to the relationship between 
rationality and coherence in a series of counterfactuals:
When she told herself that she would have no scope for action in that life in 
cambridgeshire which mr. Grey was preparing for her, she did not herself know 
what she meant by action. Had any one accused her of being afraid to separate 
herself from london society, she would have declared that she went very little into 
society and disliked that little. Had it been whispered to her that she loved the 
neighbourhood of the shops, she would have scorned the whisperer. Had it been 
suggested that the continued rattle of the big city was necessary to her happiness, 
she would have declared that she and her father had picked out for their residence 
the quietest street in london because she could not bear noise;—and yet she told 
herself that she feared to be taken into the desolate calmness of cambridgeshire. 
(141)
The passage points to a tension between Alice’s real reasons and the 
conclusions to which she has come. Alice does not like london society, 
london shops, or london noise, and each of these facts about her 
desires represents a reason to marry John Grey. but her desires are 
opaque to her in this matter: without being self-deceived, she has 
concluded that the “desolate calmness” of John Grey’s estate in 
cambridgeshire represents a reason not to marry him. This sort of 
disjunction between desires and agents’ conclusions about them is what 
rational incoherence involves, and it is significant that the problem is 
Alice’s having thought too much about her desires. in thinking about 
herself, she has distanced herself from the sort of immediate reactions 
feelings involve. As the narrator indicates, if one asks her directly 
whether she likes london, she says no; but she loses the clear connection 
to her desires when she moves to the larger question of marriage. 
correspondingly, John persuades Alice to marry him by 
critiquing her reasoning: “i think you have been foolish, misguided,—
led away by a vain ambition, and that in the difficulty to which these 
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things brought you, you endeavored to constrain yourself to do an act, 
which, when it came near to you . . . you found to be contrary to your 
nature.” Alice’s response is revealing: “now, as he spoke thus, she turned 
her eyes upon him, and looked at him, wondering that he should have 
had power to read her heart so accurately” (769). This diagnosis is consis-
tent with what John thinks throughout the novel; elsewhere he thinks of 
Alice as “one wounded, and wanting a cure” (138), brought to “a sad 
pass” by “her ill judgment” (395). He thus portrays Alice’s conscious 
beliefs as a medical condition, a “vain ambition” having so misdirected 
her assessment of what she should do that it nearly resembles insanity. 
moreover, John points suggestively to a theory of rationality in discerning 
a part of Alice that resists this condition: he appeals to her “nature,” 
suggesting that it was ultimately in some sense smarter than she was. 
When, to paraphrase his point, push came to shove and it was time to 
marry George Vavasor, Alice’s unreflective nature found the action 
“contrary” and acted against her judgment. Alice confirms this diagnosis 
in her reaction, as does the plot. even after saying she will marry George, 
Alice involuntarily resists his embrace. 
The appeal to Alice’s “nature” as an entity that opposes her 
judgment has two important implications. First, it helps to explain the 
tension between Alice’s actions and her advice to lady Glencora. As 
Juliet mcmaster has observed, Alice “can be astonishingly sententious in 
her judgments on Glencora’s behavior, and in the very matters in which 
she is herself most at fault” (612). she insists that Glencora maintain her 
marriage vow, for instance, when Alice has broken her own promises a 
number of times. This sort of hypocrisy is, of course, common; as 
mcmaster writes, “most of us have at some time irritably responded to 
cavillers: ‘don’t do what i do, do what i say!’” (613). Ordinarily such state-
ments denote the duplicity of a moral agent not living up to her ideals. 
but Trollope suggests that they can also be indicative of ethical confu-
sion. in commonplace hypocrisy the problem is that agents need to 
bring what they do in line with what they say; in ethical confusion, 
conversely, agents need to bring what they say in line with what they do. 
edward Hinchman calls this “upstream reasoning”: in 
moments of “rational akrasia,” when an agent behaves rationally in 
acting against her best judgment, he or she should manifest what 
Hinchman calls “reasonable self-mistrust” (2). maintaining a healthy 
skepticism about the capacity of one’s rational abilities, such agents 
take their inability to perform the action they have judged they should 
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do to be indicative of a reason that has been overlooked. As opposed to 
reasoning “downstream,” by which an agent forms a judgment and 
then acts, such agents reason “upstream”: having found that they 
cannot act, they reform their judgment.
second, the fact that Alice’s “nature” responds to her real 
reasons through her emotions suggests that agents’ non-deliberative 
feelings can be better guides to their actual reasons than their delib-
erations. in this light, it is significant that Alice’s ethical confusion 
arises in part from a dismissal of her emotions: “it was not her love for 
[George] that prompted her to run so terrible a risk. Had it been so, i 
think that it would be easier to forgive her. she was beginning to think 
that love . . . did not matter” (342). This dismissal of the importance of 
love is necessary, since even with “all her doubts,” Alice “never doubted 
her love for John Grey” (140). in concluding that it does “not matter” 
whether she loves George, Alice dismisses the reasons to which her 
love for John attends. rather than trusting that her affection attends 
to genuinely valuable properties that she cannot consciously articu-
late, she distrusts her own emotions. 
in suggesting that emotional reactions can be rational, and that 
Alice acts irrationally in dismissing them, Trollope speaks to an impor-
tant trend in recent moral philosophy. As karen Jones has described it, 
such feelings can be “reason-trackers”: “When an agent’s emotional 
responses are shaped, fine-tuned, and sometimes even radically trans-
formed through the process of character formation,” they can become 
“reliable at latching on to the reasons that obtain for her” (196). expla-
nations of rationality need to account for those moments when an agent 
acts rationally without recognizing that she is doing so. When well- 
developed emotions respond to a fact and subsequently move an agent to 
act in the same way she would have done had she recognized the fact and 
deliberated about it, the insistence that such deliberation is necessary for 
rational action seems implausible. The duke of st. bungay distills this 
view concisely when he remarks, “i would a deal sooner trust to instinct 
than to calculation” (Can You Forgive Her? 619).
V. Conclusion: The Instinctive Rationality of a Gentleman
in concluding that Trollope criticizes the view that moral 
deliberation should involve a process of reflective judgment and advo-
cates an instinctive version of moral agency, my argument aligns with 
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the critical consensus about Trollope’s moral philosophy. James 
kincaid points out that “the most common standard for moral behavior 
in Trollope is the code centered on the word ‘gentleman’” (12). critics 
disagree about just how substantive this code is, but most concede that 
it cannot be identified with a particular principle for action: one 
cannot be a gentleman by following a rule.13 A degree of situational 
sensitivity is required, which can be modeled if not articulated. To 
such arguments i hope to have contributed a sense of Trollope’s coher-
ence. rather than demonstrating his rejection of principle-based judg-
ment by revealing its insufficiency in evaluating specific situations, this 
essay shows Trollope questioning the psychology of judgment itself. 
Through diverse representations of irrationality, Trollope contends 
that the deliberative judgment of practical reasoning is easily misled 
into self-deception; that it can fail to motivate even when it is not biased 
by desire; and, finally, that even unbiased judgment can still be 
profoundly mistaken. Thus, Trollope offers a moral psychology that 
complements his view of moral deliberation: the gentleman represents 
an ideal for moral agency not only because he will be appropriately 
sensitive to situational particularities, but also because, in minimizing 
the ethical role of judgment, he will avoid irrationality.
Bilkent University
NOTES
1As sharon marcus puts it, “A typical Trollope novel charts the dilemmas of a 
heroine who must choose between two or more suitors” (233).
2This in some ways extends an observation by Andrew H. miller, who notes in 
passing that Trollope’s The Prime Minister (1876) is “a novel much concerned with the 
weakness of will” (77). Though miller approaches the problem differently, we share a 
sense of Trollope’s interest in akrasia. miller’s The Burdens of Perfection also directed me 
to a number of sources, including collini and sidgwick. 
3On this issue, see stroud. For my understanding of the current philosophical 
debate about akrasia, i am indebted to her explanation.
4in reading so directly for the moral-philosophical content of a work of fiction, 
and in seeing discursive passages from the narrator as a guide to that content, this essay 
practices what i elsewhere call “content formalism.” see my “in defense of Paraphrase.” 
5Embodied Selves, the anthology of Victorian psychology compiled by Jenny 
bourne Taylor and sally shuttleworth, brings together several examples of this tradition.
6see deweese-boyd for a discussion of davidson in this light, as well as exam-
ples of other thinkers defending a “partitioning” view.
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7see sidgwick, who writes of the philosophical tradition, “i find that such writers 
are apt to give an account of voluntary action which—without expressly denying the exis-
tence of what i call subjective irrationality—appears to leave no room for it” (246). 
8sidgwick’s essay, along with Trollope’s remarks in his nonfiction, matter further 
insofar as they show that an invocation of akrasia is not especially anachronistic. 
9see mele, Irrationality 54.
10This account of Glencora elides some of the complexity of this subplot’s ending. 
it turns out that she is wrong about herself: Glencora meets privately with burgo, but 
successfully rejects him (697–700). Yet Glencora doesn’t understand herself as having 
acted in a self-controlled fashion, but instead as having failed to control herself in a 
moment of cowardice: “As for running away with him, i have not courage to do it” (701). 
11There is of course a lengthy theoretical tradition diagnosing states like 
Alice’s: she is repressed. While i lack the space to offer it here, a longer treatment would 
certainly need to engage the psychoanalytic account of irrationality. 
12Arpaly is not quite prepared to concede that agents would be more procedur-
ally rational if they changed their judgment, since this is in some sense a way of 
re-instantiating the importance of reflective judgment.
13As shirley robin letwin puts it, “The manners of a gentleman are not a set of 
choreographed movements and they cannot be found in a code or a manual” (115). 
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